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INTRODUCTION 
 
Intentions 
Economics is an odd science (or, for you academic purists, it is an odd 
discipline). Its roots lie in philosophy. It is highly political and inherently 
behavioral, and yet it is firmly grounded by mathematics. As economists, 
therefore, we mustn’t limit ourselves to economics; in doing so we fail to 
understand how the science was originally synthesized and thus how it may be 
applied and how it may progress.  
The purpose of this paper is to highlight lessons from various areas of 
academia that I feel would benefit all social science. I will discuss physics, 
biology, sociology, and more, doing my best to explicitly state their 
relationships to economics throughout the paper. I hope that the lessons 
learned here will together serve as a means for prescribing and evaluating 
solutions to social problems and assist in the development of models through a 
new level of methodological dimensionality where applicable. 
 
Dimensionality 
In physics and mathematics, a dimension is some measurable extent of 
the universe. With the addition of each dimension, therefore, our 
understanding of the world and how we fit into it increases.  
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In visualizing the first dimension, we plot two points on a single axis, 
which we perceive as a line. We can then add a second axis to form a plane and 
perceive two-dimensional space. Here, our universe can contain shapes such 
as triangles and squares. The third dimension gives our universe depth, and 
our shapes are allowed to become pyramids and cubes. It is here that we 
perceive the concept of space. In the fourth dimension, we extend our universe 
through time, allowing it to change. Our pyramids can crumble, and we can 
roll our cubes on the table for a Yahtzee. Much like plotting a point (x,y) on a 
two dimensional graph, we can plot an object’s temporal position in three-
dimensional space relative to time. 
The fifth dimension is where things usually get tricky for physicists. 
Here, we see our universe, but we also see one slightly different. This alternate 
universe began with the Big Bang, like ours, and exists in the same position as 
ours, but embodies what our universe might have been. It is a product of 
possibility and thus grants us the power to observe the similarities and 
differences between two worlds, two outcomes, or two applications of the same 
theory.  
I’ll be using the fifth dimension to conceptually illustrate methodological 
approaches to interpreting and explaining economic phenomena, but it is 
worth noting that the fifth dimension—called probability space—does make 
scientific sense. The “multi-verse” or “many worlds” interpretation of quantum 
mechanics suggests that every possible outcome for our universe is equally 
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real, but we as observers can only see one of them at a time. None the less, we 
will focus on the theoretical applications of probability space as a way of 
thinking about and in examining social science. The fifth dimension will serve 
to metaphorically illustrate this new way of thinking, through which we will 
construct a theoretical framework that applies three lessons we’ll learn from 
various realms of academia.  
 
How to Blow a Bubble 
 In understanding the development of any useful model (and perhaps 
applying fifth dimension analytical principles to other models) it is undoubtably 
crucial to understand the basics of bubble theory and why I include the factors 
that I do. So, a brief lesson is in order.  
 A financial bubble is a rapid inflation of an asset’s price succeeded by a 
rapid contraction. In the discipline as a whole, there is not a uniform 
explanation as to what causes financial bubbles or why they pop when they do. 
There are, however, two main themes that are supported by the literature that 
play a complimentary role.  
 There is evidence to suggest that socio-psychological factors play a 
significant role in bubble formation—a role that is necessary but not sufficient 
to generating a bubble.  The most prominent of these behavioral factors is 
momentum trading, the phenomenon in which investors buy and sell in the 
direction of the current market trend. This makes markets much more volatile 
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as positive feedback loops are established and subsequently abandoned. New 
technology can create a frenzied market culture of, say, internet fanatics that 
make large, frequent trades that increase volatility. Web-based companies in 
the late 1990’s certainly sunk their teeth into investors propensity to react 
strongly to popular trends, resulting in the dot-com bubble. Since much of this 
behavior is culturally motivated, it can vary widely by asset class and across 
time.  
 Perhaps a more predictable cause of financial bubbles is excess liquidity. 
Liquidity is positively related to relaxed borrowing standards and high 
disposable incomes. In the case of the Great Recession, expansionary monetary 
policy reduced interest rates and lax regulation allowed unprecedented 
amounts of leveraged speculation. Large disposable incomes increased the 
trade volumes in asset and equity markets, and all this together made the 
markets vulnerable to short-term speculative practices. More generally, I turn 
to an explanation by Paul Krugman, who pointedly notes the problem with 
highly liquid markets: 
 
“[Individual crises] aren’t just a series of unrelated accidents… What we’re seeing is 
what happens when too much money is chasing too few investment opportunities.” 
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Although the literature offers a vast array of potential causes, liquidity 
and psychological factors are the most persistent, and the only ones necessary 
for the discussions to follow.  
 
LESSONS 
 
Curiosity and Crisis 
 “Why?” is a uniquely human question. Other animals are certainly 
curious, but they tend not to worry about the reasons or causes of things. In 
part, this quality is evolutionary—we must be curious in some respects 
because if we do not understand the mechanisms of the world around us, we 
surely won’t last long. Human curiosity, however, seems to puzzle many 
evolutionary theorists because we exhibit the quality in amounts that far 
exceed the requirement for survival (and often times get us into trouble). One 
popular belief amongst psychologists and evolutionary biologists is that 
explanation serves as a coping mechanism. That is, the better we think we 
understand something, the less we fear it.  
 This is, of course, an excellent means for optimizing behavior directly 
through one’s own trial and error or indirectly through the analysis of others. It 
isn’t until we misunderstand, however, that things don’t go our way.  
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 In the years leading up to the Great Recession, for example, and even 
after the crisis had begun, many in the industry had no conception of the 
impending crash. The banks that sold bad CDO’s (i.e. Lehman and Bear 
Sterns) had fundamentally miscalculated market risk and (in the former case) 
the government’s willingness to act when the company’s life was at stake.  
Looking back, every person who misunderstood the financial terrain of 
the time could undoubtedly explain what went wrong and how their failures 
were manifested over a specific period of time. As a matter of fact, any high 
schooler who’s seen the Big Short could tell you that the financial crisis was 
due to the housing crash. An economist might further explain that the crash in 
question is the popping of the subprime mortgage bubble—a product of low 
interest rates, financial innovation, securitization, lax regulation, and reckless 
lending—and that that in and of itself is a mere piece of the puzzle, as there 
were many complementary factors that contributed to the problem.  
But suppose there were no crisis—that is, suppose all circumstances 
were the same, but the housing bubble settled, and the market was able to 
tolerate its own risk, and the banks did not fail—could the economist explain 
this? I pose that he could. Economists, after all, are an intelligent bunch.  
Further, I suggest that his ability to explain both circumstances equally 
well represents a fundamental flaw in the social sciences. The problem is that 
the economist could make sense of both situations because he is explaining 
retrospectively, analyzing what happened and what caused it to happen rather 
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than what could’ve happened and what did or didn’t cause it to not happen. If 
we asked him five years (or even five weeks) before the beginning of the Great 
Recession what the biggest threat to the American economy was at the time, 
could he have answered? Would his reasons be the same? Would he have 
predicted the collapse?  
It is very likely that the answer to all of these questions is no, as there 
were very few economists, bankers, and financiers that were worried about the 
state of the economy at the time, and fewer still that predicted the housing 
crash. 
Put more simply, after an event occurs, our explanation places far too 
much weight on what happened than on what could’ve happened but did not. 
And, given that it is human nature to analyze only that which is sufficiently 
interesting or important, we account for only a small portion of events that may 
contribute to our understanding and fail to consider whether this 
understanding is temporally consistent. This creates incalculable logical 
vulnerabilities, especially when reasoning through relatively isolated events 
such as financial bubbles and it is therefore imperative to limit these 
vulnerabilities so that our curiosity does not turn against us the dangerous tool 
that is our explanatory power. 
In the next section, we’ll take a step back from economics and analyze 
the logical complications of retrospection from a socio-psychological 
perspective. 
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The American Soldier 
 Sunday, December 7th, 1941: 353 Imperial Japanese planes launch from 
6 aircraft carriers in the central pacific to attack Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The 
attack kills more than 2,400 Americans in 120 minutes and leads to the formal 
entrance of the United States in WWII 24 hours later. Over the next 4 years 
roughly 11% of the US population, or 16 million Americans serve in the 
military and more than 400,000 of those Americans die.  
During the war, a small, temporary branch of the Information and 
Education Division of the US War Department began conducting research. The 
agency completed 300 studies consisting of more than 600,000 interviews 
dealing with various stages of a soldier’s life and military experience. In a 1949 
review of the study, sociologist Paul Lazarsfeld presented his readers with 
various findings, three of which I will discuss: 
 
A. Soldiers from rural backgrounds were usually in better spirits during their Army life than soldiers from city 
backgrounds.  
B. Southern soldiers were better able to stand the climate in the hot South Sea Islands than Northern soldiers.  
C. White soldiers were more eager to become non-coms than black soldiers. 
 
Lazarsfeld explains that men from rural backgrounds are more used to poor 
living standards and demanding physical labor compared to city-dwelling men, 
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and therefore do not react as negatively when presented with harsh wartime 
environments. Southern soldiers could better adapt to the heat in the South 
Pacific because they were used to sweltering conditions back home. African 
Americans were heavily discriminated against in the 1940’s. Jim Crowe laws 
were still in place and the nation was heavily segregated—Martin Luthor King 
Jr would not give his “I Have a Dream” speech for another twenty years. It 
makes sense, then, that black soldiers are not overzealous about fighting for a 
country that systematically repressed them. And it certainly makes sense that 
they would not be more motivated than white soldiers to seek promotion within 
an institution that asks them to die fighting for the rights of others when their 
family members at home could not eat at the same restaurants, go to the same 
schools, or apply for the same jobs as everyone else.  
This all seems obvious. Or, at least, it all makes sense. It makes so much 
sense, in fact, that Lazarsfeld’s readers are shocked to find that the results 
presented to them by the author are actually the exact opposite of the study’s 
true findings. That is, men from city backgrounds, not men from rural 
backgrounds, are typically in better spirits during wartime. Southern soldiers 
had, at the very least, just as much trouble adapting to the heat of the South 
Sea as northern soldiers, and blacks were significantly more motivated to 
attain higher ranks than their white counterparts.  
Thinking through this new information, we should be able to explain it with 
relative ease. I urge you to first reason through all three findings on your own, 
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but we will analyze finding A together: During their time in the Army, city men 
are typically in better spirits than rural men because they are more used to 
crowded living conditions and strict chains of command, both of which are 
prominent aspects of military service.  
This makes sense. One can imagine, even, that if presented with this finding 
and its explanation in place of its aforementioned opposite, then it would seem 
obvious. Herein lies the problem with retrospective reasoning. We could’ve 
taken either the true finding or the false finding as fact and justified each 
equally well. None of this is to say that retrospective reasoning is of 
insignificant value, nor does it imply that social scientists are in some way 
mistaken in its usage. What is does suggest is that, although this is a very 
necessary logical tool, it is also a very dangerous one, and social scientists are 
often mistaken in its application—Hindsight may be twenty-twenty, but we may 
be looking far too closely.  
 
A Defense of the Reviled 
 Given an example of conflicting retrospective analyses in simple terms, 
we can now ask what led many revered economists and organizations to so 
grossly misjudge the economic conditions of 2007 and 2008 and fail to predict 
the impending crisis. 
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“It is not just that they missed it, they positively denied it would happen.” 
--Franklin Allen, Wharton School of Business 
  
In order to do the crisis retrospective justice, I won’t explain it myself. 
Instead, I’ll let former Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke give his 
assessment of the period’s macroeconomic conditions. The following 
statements are selected according to relevance from the Semiannual Monetary 
Policy Report to Congress before the Committee on Financial Services in June 
of 2007. At this time, housing prices had already begun to fall, and worries 
were mounting in the subprime mortgage industry.   
 
“After having run at an above-trend rate earlier in the current economic recovery, U.S. economic growth has proceeded during the past 
year at a pace more consistent with sustainable expansion… the demand for labor has remained solid, with more than 850,000 jobs having 
been added to payrolls thus far in 2007 and the unemployment rate having remained at 4-1/2 percent…  
To a considerable degree, the slower pace of economic growth in recent quarters reflects the ongoing adjustment in the housing sector… 
Although a leveling-off of home sales in the second half of 2006 suggested some tentative stabilization of housing demand, sales have 
softened further this year… Sales should ultimately be supported by growth in income and employment as well as by mortgage rates that-
-despite the recent increase--remain fairly low relative to historical norms… 
`Consumption outlays are likely to continue growing at a moderate pace, aided by a strong labor market. Employment should continue to 
expand, though possibly at a somewhat slower pace than in recent years… Real compensation appears to have risen over the past year, 
and… should rise further as labor demand remains strong and productivity increases… Like consumption spending, business fixed 
investment overall seems poised to rise at a moderate pace, bolstered by gains in sales and generally favorable financial conditions. The 
global economy continues to be strong. Supported by solid economic growth abroad, U.S. exports should expand further in comin g 
quarters… 
For the most part, financial markets have remained supportive of economic growth. However, conditions in the subprime mortgage sector 
have deteriorated significantly, reflecting mounting delinquency rates on adjustable-rate loans. In recent weeks, we have also seen 
increased concerns among investors about credit risk on some other types of financial instruments. Credit spreads on lower-quality 
corporate debt have widened somewhat, and terms for some leveraged business loans have tightened. Even after their recent rise, 
however, credit spreads remain near the low end of their historical ranges, and financing activity in the bond and business loan markets 
has remained fairly brisk… 
Overall, the U.S. economy appears likely to expand at a moderate pace over the second half of 2007, with growth then strengthening a bit 
in 2008… 
Federal Reserve has been active in implementing, interpreting, and enforcing consumer protection laws... Promoting access to credit and 
to home ownership are important objectives, and responsible subprime mortgage lending can help advance both goals… Financial losses 
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have subsequently induced lenders to tighten their underwriting standards. We are conducting a top-to-bottom review of possible actions 
we might take to help prevent recurrence of these problems… 
We already have improved a disclosure that creditors must provide to every applicant for an adjustable-rate mortgage product to explain 
better the features and risks of these products… In coordination with the other federal supervisory agencies, last year we issued principles-
based guidance on nontraditional mortgages, and in June of this year we issued supervisory guidance on subprime lending. In a ddition, 
we reviewed our policies related to the examination of nonbank subsidiaries of bank and financial holding companies for compliance with 
consumer protection laws and guidance… 
Agencies will collaborate in determining the lessons learned and in seeking ways to better cooperate in ensuring effective and  consistent 
examinations of and improved enforcement for nondepository mortgage lenders…” 
 
 The sections I’ve pulled from Bernanke’s speech are lengthy, but I feel 
that this length is necessary to communicate the actions and understanding of 
the government. The Fed was not oblivious to the risks that underlay the 
market, but these risks seemed to be limited by both a strong economy and 
increased regulatory action. Based on Bernanke’s assessment of the economy 
and the strides taken to mitigate its vulnerabilities, I pose that we could’ve 
explained 2008 equally well if the financial crisis never happened. Bernanke’s 
statements are not ignorant or ill informed. The outlook is not only optimistic, 
but macroeconomically supported. So, in general, the only reason people 
stopped believing that the economy was not only stable but would continue to 
expand is because the crash did happen. That is, just as Lazarsfeld’s initial list 
of “facts” led us to conclude untrue statements about specific characteristics 
that were logically compatible with the false notion that rural men were often in 
better spirits than city men during the war, the theory that US banks in the 
late 2000’s had limited risk through securitization and that high housing 
prices could be supported by economic growth led many economists to 
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conclude that the financial practices of the time posed no major threat to the 
banking system or the economy overall. 
 
Lesson 1: Retrospection. 
In assessing the past, we must reconcile what was with what 
could’ve been in order to splice out pushing and pulling forces and 
isolate meaning variables. This also could allow us to establish a 
factor hierarchy—That is, determine which market forces may 
supersede the others in times of instability.  
 
Retrospection in the Fifth 
Appealing to the fifth dimension can allow us to beneficially utilize the 
powers of retrospection. In the cases above, we used comparative retrospection 
to isolate important variables and determine their relative importance, but we 
can attempt to use this same concept to gain insight into the future. That is, 
given various future realities, we attempt to explain them using future-to-
present retrospective logic. In some sense we do this all the time, but more 
commonly we attempt to travel forward using a specific line of reasoning. The 
latter method is not a bad way to start, but it is almost always deterministic 
and definitive. So, instead of allowing for a few possible outcomes and 
16 
 
assigning them probabilities, it follows a series of events or considers a number 
of factors that lead to a single outcome.  
Of course, many mathematical models are probability based and can give 
the likelihoods of a variety of outcomes. The reason for incorporating 
retrospective dimensionality, then, is not only to assign probabilities to 
outcomes, but to determine how well a model can explain an outcome given 
that it is the only outcome. If a model cannot explain an outcome that it has 
been programmed to consider, given inputs conducive to that outcome’s 
realization, then the model could be flawed in its inclusion or exclusion of 
relevant variables. Thinking backwards, given a state of the world, can allow us 
to consider factors that we previously did not. 
 In modeling a bubble, lesson 1 posits that we must reconcile what was 
with what could’ve been. That is, in sourcing data, the isolated event that is the 
crisis period should not be analyzed as if it were the only possible outcome 
because crises are in no way inevitable, and triggers are difficult to determine. 
Just as Instead, we should retrospectively determine the probability of the 
crisis given the severity of the vulnerabilities and the probability of the trigger. 
Lesson 1 is especially important in considering a model for bubbles 
because bubbles are almost exclusively defined in retrospect. Bubbles are 
essentially just large, positive price deviations from an asset’s intrinsic value. If 
you are someone who believes that an asset has an intrinsic value irrespective 
of what people are willing to pay for it, then its intrinsic value is nearly 
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impossible to determine in the real world due to speculative growth potential, 
brand equity considerations, etc. So, the only real way to know if something is 
a bubble outside of a controlled experiment is if it pops, and retrospectively 
deterministic models therefore far more likely to be biased. 
 
Granovetter’s Riot 
Consider two societies—in each society there are 100 disgruntled citizens 
gathered outside their mayor’s mansion peacefully protesting recent executive 
actions. Whether or not the peaceful protests escalate into violent riots is 
intuitively based on each person’s willingness to join a riot. Because each 
person’s chances of legal repercussions from taking violent actions are limited 
as the number of rioters increases (this is implicitly assumed as part of the 
model), each person’s willingness to join the riot is based on the number of 
people currently rioting. Each person can thus be assigned a value N that is 
representative of this willingness and indicates the minimum number of people 
currently rioting required for that person to join. That is, if Ni = 50, then a 
personi will join the riot only after 50 others do so before him.  
 In the first society, each individual has a unique N value ascending from 
zero such that N1=0, N2=1, N3=2 and so on, up to N100=99. This means that 
after the first person starts getting violent, the second person follows, then the 
third, then the fourth, until all 100 citizens are wreaking havoc in the streets.  
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 Suppose the second society is nearly identical, however two citizens have 
N values of 6 and no citizen has an N value of 5. After the first rioter joins, as 
do citizens 2 through 5. But, no persons other than those already rioting are 
willing to join for any number of rioters less than 6. Thus, the society is 95% 
peaceful.   
 In assessing the outcomes of these two societies, an observer could point 
to any number of sociological factors. Perhaps society 1 is inherently more 
violent. Perhaps they have higher unemployment rates and thus decreased 
incentives to stay out of prison. Perhaps their diets make them more prone to 
hormonal fluctuations and emotional outbursts! There are infinitely many 
potential explanations based on distinguishable factors but suppose none of 
these factors differ from one society to the next. How can we possibly explain 
the vastly different results of the collective by modeling the decision-making 
process based on a single individual? 
 
Lesson 2: The Micro-Macro Problem. 
 In the context of collective action, we cannot model behavior based 
on a representative agent because the behavior of the whole is 
emergent. Failure to correctly recognize emergent characteristic 
leads to inaccurate models in both the physical and social sciences.  
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Micro-Macro Fusion in the Fifth 
 In applying lesson 2, the question then arises how one might get from 
one level of reality to the next. Emergent behavior is something that many 
models in the natural sciences must contend with, and here the difficulty of 
reconciliation is explicit. We do not try to understand the human genome as if 
it behaves like a single gene, and we do not try to explain complex organism in 
terms of the cells that make them up, or the atoms that make up the cells. In 
fact, physics, chemistry, and biology each essentially operate by their own set 
of rules and regularities. In social science, however, we too often attempt to 
map collective behavior onto individual psychologies through the use of a 
hypothetical individual whose thoughts and actions can explain trends of the 
entire population. As Columbia University physicist and sociologist Duncan 
Watts puts it,  
 
“No matter how it is done…the representative agent is only and always a 
convenient fiction.” 
 
Although fifth dimension principles aren’t necessary in developing 
something like, say, a threshold model, they can be helpful in estimating the 
likelihood of emergence and its effect on various outcomes. Moreover, the 
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retrospective aspects of fifth dimensional thinking can improve models that 
attempt to be both micro-sensitive and collectively representative. 
Lesson 2 provides that investing behavior, like riot behavior, is the result 
of individual propensities or thresholds that manifest on a macro level. It is 
dangerous to assume that the psychology of trend investing can be modeled by 
a representative agent that responds to a trend when the agents themselves are 
the cause of the trend. To assume that the collective behaves like the average 
member of the collective is to claim that one can derive a realistic 
understanding of the human psyche based on working knowledge of individual 
neurons.  
 
 
Granovetter, Continued 
Now let’s add to our analysis by implementing a structural component. 
Suppose that both societies are prone to the usage of Molotov cocktails—
explosives that increase the violent tendencies of those in close temporal 
proximity to ignition and effectively decrease the N value for the first five 
individuals considering joining the riot succeeding its ignition by a single unit. 
So, if a cocktail is used after person 10 joins the riot, then the N values of 
persons 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 decrease by one.  
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In both societies, a cocktail serves as a trigger, at which point person 1 
begins rioting. In the first society only, each individual has a unique N value 
and all persons in this society riot as they do in Granovetter’s original model 
regardless of the N-decreasing effects of the trigger. 
The second society is the same as the first, except two citizens have N 
values of 6 and no citizen has an N value of 5. In this case, the cocktail ignites 
and the N values of persons 1-5 each decrease by 1 such that N1=-1 rather 
than 0, and N5=3 rather than 4. All other N values are unaffected and thus, 
again, society 2 behaves the same as the original model in which the first 5 
citizens are the only ones to riot.  
Now suppose that 10 years pass. The same 100 people with the same N 
values remain in each society, and again they gather in protest. This time, 
however, the materials for a Molotov cocktail only become available after a 
certain number of rioters begin wreaking havoc—let’s call it 5. So, a Molotov 
ignites in response to person 5 joining the riot instead of igniting before person 
1 joins the riot. In society 1, we already know that everyone will riot regardless 
of ignition, so the N-decreasing effects of the cocktail from persons 6 through 
10 are irrelevant.  
In society 2, however, this is not the case. The ignition’s effects 
essentially bridge the gap that previously existed between persons 5 and 6 
because N6 now equals five. Each person then joins the riot in sequence after 
person 6 and the entire town is overcome with violence.  
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So, even if we know, as Granovetter did, the N value of each citizen, that 
each citizen behaves based on this value, and that a Molotov decreases the N 
values of the five persons succeeding its ignition, our model will not accurately 
predict the outcome of the last society if we do not account for the structural 
change that made cocktail materials more difficult to acquire. 
Of course, predicting 5 out of 6 of the societies’ outcomes correctly is 
quite good even if we do not understand the underlying processes at play. As 
Milton Friedman put it,  
 
“The relevant question to ask about the “assumptions” of a theory is not whether they 
are descriptively ‘realistic,’ for they never are, but whether they are sufficiently good 
approximations for the purpose in hand. And this question can be answered only by 
seeing whether the theory works…” 
 
A perfectly rational and undeniably common question to ask, then, is if a 
model can predict outcomes with a fair degree of accuracy, why do we care that 
it lacks explanatory power? And the answer is that in most cases we don’t. 
Perhaps in most cases we really shouldn’t care, because the purpose of a 
theory and its relevant models is, more often than not, to compile inputs in 
such a way that we can sufficiently attest to probable future problems. 
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We have now reached a point in time, however, that due to this 
structural change, the assumptions off which we base our model will cause 
systematic predictive failures and we will no longer be able to prescribe 
meaningful solutions. 
 Reconsider Friedman’s excerpt. Essentially all that he has stated is that 
certain assumptions are only good unless they are bad. Which, as simple as it 
sounds, is not only very reasonable but quite useful in scientific and logical 
fact-finding. However, it would be an unprecedented failure of any social 
discipline to assume that what once was good or bad is still so—And herein lies 
a fatal flaw because now what the statement truly means is that certain 
assumptions are good not unless they are bad, but until they are bad. 
 
Momentum and Molotovs 
 These examples are both abstractions and oversimplifications, and 
Granovetter’s riot model is a highly specific situation in which the threshold 
explanation for collective behavior may carry some weight.  
Interestingly enough, riot behavior is strikingly similar to the behavior 
whose result is a financial bubble. Consider the rise and fall of Bitcoin in the 
last half-decade. Cryptocurrency as recent as 2016 was not something the 
general population was even aware of, and the thing about currency is that if 
no one accepts it, then it holds no value. Like any asset, the price of currency 
ought to be based on its value. When crypto began to gain popularity, its 
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dollar-value increased, and investors began to notice. The hesitancy of the 
inexperienced investor was mitigated in proportion to the number of other 
investors who trusted the asset’s stability or potential for growth. In other 
words, if you invest in something, then I am more willing to do so because its 
value is based on what people are willing to pay for it, and the price of an asset 
increases as its demand increases.  
The issue was that the rate at which people were investing far outpaced 
the rate at which people were transacting. So, it was not unlikely that you 
knew 10 people holding cryptocurrency as an investment and zero people 
utilizing it as an asset. Therefore, when it came time to cash in, there were 
many people looking to sell and very few looking to buy, which drove the price 
down over 80% in a single year.  
In most cases, bubbles excluded, small fluctuations in stock price do not 
cause frenzied trading. Perhaps, given a superficial dip, a few fickle investors 
will sell their shares, but most investors will not because their thresholds (i.e. 
their N values) are not sufficiently low. Structural changes on Wall Street, 
however, prove disruptive.  
Cocktails as N-decreasing responses to a riot already initiated bare a 
curious resemblance to the program trading systems that helped cause the 
crash of 1987. These programs would automatically dump large quantities of 
stocks from a portfolio if prices decreased at a specified rate or to a specific 
amount. So, if investors sold off enough shares, the computer would 
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automatically pick up on the trend and sell more, driving the price down even 
further and worrying more investors, who would then sell more shares because 
the programs effectively decreased investor’s N values.  
No crisis is the same as the last because each time a crisis occurs, we 
run extensive analyses to determine its cause and act to prevent a second 
crisis in the same vein. But, because no crisis is the same as the last, it doesn’t 
make sense to speculate on future crises using assumptions from the past 
model that are specifically tailored to the last crisis or are a product of the last 
few crises 
 
Lesson 3: Adaptability 
In economics, structural variation can change the rules of the game. 
Recognizing this and building models that incorporate at least the 
possibility of shifting foundations is an important factor in 
maintaining predictive power.  
 
Adaptability in the Fifth 
 Time and the possibility for change are at the heart of the fifth 
dimension. The primary thing to consider is that we often do not know how 
significant the effects on our assumptions or behaviors are when structure 
does change. Because of this, we must do our best to include adaptable 
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assumptions or, at least decrease the weight of structurally dependent 
assumptions as the rate of structural change increases. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The Apple  
 There has been a steady push in recent history for the “scientification” of 
the disciplines. Most notably, you’ve likely heard the desperate cries of 
psychologists begging to be let into the science club. In economics, 
professionals and academics strive to better incorporate scientific principles 
into their research. For example, the gravity model of trade takes Isaac 
Newton’s law of universal gravitation and renames the variables to explain 
import and export volumes between two countries: 
   
(As it happens, this model predicts bilateral trade with a fair degree of 
accuracy) 
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So, we now have a quant-focused discipline of financial engineers and 
Masters of Science in taxation, and for the most part this is good. It is a 
beneficial shift to more uniform strategies and the satisfaction of the five basic 
requirements of a science: 
1. Clearly defined terminology 
2. Quantifiability 
3. Highly controlled experimental conditions 
4. Reproducibility 
5. Predictability and Testability 
I fear that without a five dimensional framework, this push to align the 
discipline more closely with the physical sciences can have dangerous 
implications, especially in crisis theory.  
 As the story goes, when an apple fell from a tree and struck young Isaac 
Newton in the head, he had an epiphany. Over the course of his research, he 
was able to model his theory and come up with one of the most simple, 
intuitive, and no doubt famous equations of all time (perhaps second only to 
Einstein’s E=MC2). Gravity today is scientific fact, and we use Newton’s 
equation to accurately predict the flight path of objects millions of miles away 
and land rovers on distant planets. And yet, this is not rocket science (so to 
speak).  
 These fundamental truths of the physical sciences are the envy of many 
social disciplines. Wouldn’t it be nice, for instance, if we had this sort of 
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predictive power to anticipate the economy’s flight path from months away? 
Most investors couldn’t even tell you whether next week’s markets will be up or 
down or sideways, as Ben Bernanke so gracefully illustrated. And this isn’t 
because they’re not intelligent enough to figure it out, it is because there is an 
inherent difference between the physical and social sciences that prevents us 
from operating under the same rules.  
Every single apple in the universe under the same conditions will behave 
in the same way. If I drop an apple out of my hand it will hit the ground with 
the exact same force in the exact same amount of time as every other apple of 
the same weight and dimension, and for this reason physical sciences do not 
often require fifth dimension analysis. Even if we had no conception of the 
physical processes that govern the universe, we would still know how an apple 
would behave if we’d seen another apple under the same conditions. In social 
science, however, the “apples” do behave differently. An “apple” dropped in 
1987 and an “apple” dropped in 2008 will not take the same path to the 
ground, and for this reason we must make beneficial use of retrospective 
principles, as prescribed by lesson 1. 
 Moreover, the same laws that govern the behavior of Newton’s apples 
govern the behavior of planets. In social science, however, the actions of a 
group cannot be modeled like the actions of an individual as illustrated in 
Granovetter’s riot and explicitly stated in lesson 2.  
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Financial bubbles in particular are largely products of human behavior 
as opposed to mathematically sound economic fundamentals, but there are 
certainly mathematically sound financial incentives to behave in certain ways 
given certain conditions as evidenced by various liquidity theories. It is 
therefore very difficult to make rules for both aspects of economics together 
because not only are social standards of behavior in constant flux, but the 
physical makeup of the financial system changes as well. So, models based on 
a five-dimensional framework must, to the best of their abilities, be adaptable 
in accordance with lesson 3.  
 
Final Thoughts 
In physics and mathematics, a dimension is some measurable extent of 
the universe. With the addition of each dimension, therefore, our 
understanding of the world and how we fit into it increases.  
Each of the concepts above are lessons in theoretic frameworks for any 
academic, and attempt to grant both future and past models a level of 
dimensionality previous unseen in social science.  It is now up to the reader to 
contemplate and scrutinize these principles. It is also up to the reader, 
however, to analyze and apply them in ways they see fit in order to gain 
perspective, advance disciplines, and of course, increase our understanding of 
the world and how we fit into it.  
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